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This study generates an econometric model of the allocation of political contribu- 
tions by food firms. It combines information about food firms' total expenditures 
for political influence with the behavioral assumption of profit maximization to 
test the  hypothesis  that food manufacturing  firms do not  lobby  against  farm 
policies. The results support the hypothesis. The inferences are conditional on the 
effects observed in the sample. The conclusions from this analysis may not be 
widely generalizable, but they do inform hypotheses about the intentions of food 
firms that participate in the political market. 
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Outside of the farm sector, little attention has been given to the way stakeholders in 
the  food and agricultural  system allocate their political  contributions.  Makinson 
reports that in the  1990 federal election campaign, for example, food processing 
and sales firms contributed $3 million,  while  farm input and services suppliers 
contributed $2.7 million, brokers and commodity dealers $1.3 million, and crop 
production and basic processing $4.1 million. Individual food processing finns such 
as ConAgra, Inc. contributed $208,699, General Mills $100,000, Flowers Industry 
$135,550, and Nabisco Brands, Inc. $84,400. Trade organizations such as the Food 
Marketing Institute contributed $376,562, the American  Meat Institute $1 33,471, 
and the National Wholesale Grocers Association $376,562. 
In all  these cases, it is unclear whether these campaign contributions by food 
firms are directed toward  government intervention  in  agricultural commodities 
markets, or policies and regulations related to their output/sales markets, or both. 
Differentiating the impacts of food firms' expenditures for political influence is the 
focus of this study. In particular, we address the question of how much influence 
over farm commodity policies food manufacturing and processing finns seek to 
Fidele Ndayisenga, Ph.D.. is an economisl. Agricultural  Policy Branch, Agriculture Canada. Ottawa: Sean Kinsey 1s 
aprofessor In the Depammen~ofAgricciltural  and Applied Econom~cs,  and D~rector  ofthe Retail Food Industry Center. 
Universily of Minnesota. 
This work was supported by the MinnesotaAgricultul.al  Experiment Station, Sc~entific  Journal Serles No. 2 1,672. 22  Spring  1999  Jouri~al  ofAgribusiness 
have. With  farm products estimated to account for as much as 70% of material 
utilized  by food manufacturing firms (Adelaja), one might expect them to lobby 
against policies that raise commodity prices. On the other hand, they may value a 
steady  supply  of  commodity  inputs  fostered  by  stable  (albeit  higher)  prices, 
especially if these prices can be passed down the line to consumers. There is some 
anecdotal evidence that the same large food manufacturers lobby against sugar and 
peanut programs, but  for tobacco programs even though they all raise input prices 
(Ono). It is worth noting that both sugar and peanut programs raise input prices via 
quotas where the cost is borne more directly by consumers, while major commodity 
programs (wheat, corn, milk) tend  to  support prices with  taxpayer dollars.' On 
balance, it is not obvious which way food manufacturers' influence on farm policy 
leans, or if it is significant. 
Political contributions are used for three levels of lobbying by food manufacturing 
firms.  The  first  level  is  through  general  organizations  such  as  the  Grocery 
Manufacturers of America, the American Food Marketing Institute, or  the American 
Frozen Food Institute. These general organizations lobby on issues that most affect 
their members. The issues are complex, too expensive for individual firms to deal 
with, and have public goods characteristics. The general organizations' objective is, 
therefore, to solve for member companies those problems for which group action is 
more  effective than  actions by  companies acting individually  or through  other 
associations (Guither, p. 73). 
The second level of lobbying is by agribusiness commodity organizations such 
as the American Feed Manufacturers Association, the Sweetener Users Association, 
or the  Milk  Industry  Foundation. At this  stage, policy  concerns become  more 
product and commodity specific. The size of the membership in these agribusiness 
organizations depends on the number of firms that are involved in the processing of 
the commodity and the share of this commodity in the total input cost of the firm. 
The third level of lobbying, and the focus of this analysis, is at the firm level with 
emphasis  on firm-specific  issues.  The  Archer-Daniels  Midland  Company, for 
example, lobbied intensively for ethanol subsidies and provided active support for 
sugar quotas. The first tends to increase the supply of corn, a major input to ethanol, 
and makes it possible to sell ethanol at a competitive price. The latter increases the 
demand for corn sweeteners, making them more competitive economically (Browne, 
pp. 120-125). 
This study tests whether food firms make political contributions primarily to 
influence their input markets. The model used for this test is adopted from studies 
of farm input allocations (Just et al.). The use of this model is motivated by the fact 
that while food firms [nay lobby in both their input and output markets, they do not 
typically record political contributions for each market separately. The test focuses 
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on the significance of contributions in the input market and provides evidence about 
lobbying for or against agricultural policies by food firms. If food firms' political 
contributions in their input markets are not significant, this will provide indirect 
evidence that either food firms rely on commodity-specific trade organizations to 
lobby for them, or they do not place much emphasis on lobbying in their input 
markets. While this analysis states the results at the industry level, it is more likely 
that the influence of manufacturers on farm policy depends on the degree of their 
dependency on raw material. There is evidence to suggest that the impact of farm 
product  prices  on  food  processing  varies  by  three-digit  Standard  Industrial 
Classification  (SIC)  category  due  to  differences in  reliance  on  farm products 
(Adelaja). 
Conceptual Framework 
Interest of'Food Firn~s  in Agricultural Policies 
The manufacturing sector has been generally excluded froin interest group analysis 
of agricultural policy for two related reasons. First, consistent with Engel's law, the 
share of food  in total consumption declines with growth  in per  capita incomes, 
diminishing the effect of high food prices on the cost of living, and thus on the wage 
bill of the manufacturing sector. The share of U.S. household expenditures for food 
has fallen from about 33% to about 11% in the last five decades. The decreased 
impact of food expenditures on the wage bill acts against manufacturers'  involve- 
ment in agricultural policy issues. However, even if the impact of food costs was 
substantial, the public goods nature of low food costs, and associated free-rider 
issues,  suggest  that  lobbying  would  be  more  likely  to  take  place  at  the 
manufacturers'  association level rather than at the firm level. Second, the capital 
intensity  of  most  businesses  and  industries  increases  with  development,  thus 
rendering producers' surplus less sensitive to changes in wages than may result fi-om 
changes in farm-level commodity prices (Baliscan and Roumasset). The problem 
with  this  view  is  that  it  treats  the  food  manufacturing  and  the  rest  of  the 
manufacturing sector symmetrically when the use of farm products, as inputs, is 
concentrated in food processing and agribusiness finns. 
The strength of the argument that farm inputs might be important enough to food 
manufacturers to induce them to lobby for lower prices rests on three factors. First, 
the share of other inputs in the total cost is relatively small. For example, in  1977, 
labor accounted for 13.4%, power and fuel accounted for 1.594, packaging and con- 
tainers accounted for 9.1 %; and agricultural related inputs (livestock, crops, marine 
products, semifinished foodstuffs, and imports of tropical commodities) accounted 
for 48.194 (Connor). While these numbers vary across firms, agricultural commod- 
ities remain the most important cost item, and likely one of the most variable. 
Second, among all the inputs, government intervention-and  therefore scope 
for  political  influence-is  more  pervasive and  concentrated in the  agricultural commodities. Thus there is a high likelihood that if food firms lobby at all in their 
input markets, it would be for favorable (lower) prices and larger, steady supplies 
of agricultural commodities. This would be even more so in the soybean oil and 
meat-packing processes where agricultural products and semi-processed foodstuffs 
constitute 76% of the total input cost (Connor). Therefore, discovering significant 
lobbying by food firms in their input markets would provide strong indirect evidence 
about lobbying forces in agricultural policies. 
Finally, there is casual evidence to suggest that commodity policies ofthe last few 
decades probably benefitted the food processing sector. Knutson, Penn, and Boehm, 
for example. note that (a)  the sugar policy in combination with ethanol subsidies has 
built the corn sweetener industry, (h)  domestic processors benefit from target prices 
because they are more likely to be able to sell finished products at prices that are 
competitive with imports, and (c) commodity stocks provide long-run supply and 
price stability. one of the desired outcomes of policy. In addition, food processors 
benefit from publicly sponsored agricultural research through higher quality and 
generally  lower priced  farm products.  Of course.  not  every  food manufacturer 
or processing fin11  benefits  from every  commodity  program.  For  example, the 
Sweetener Users Association, which represents soft drink companies, bakers, ice 
cream manufacturers, and confectioners, has been lobbying unsuccessfully for the 
elimination of the sugar prosram which increases sugar prices by restricting imports 
and regulating domestic supplies. But the sugar program is an exception rather than 
the rule. 
Even though some food processors appear to benefit from existing farm policies, 
these policies have largely been initiated by  farm commodity groups or fanners' 
organizations.  Furthermore, the  impacts of these cotnmodity programs on  food 
manufacturing firms are not uniform. Thus, it is not clear whether individual food 
processing and manufacturing firms actively lobby to have the policies maintained 
or changed. This question is different from that of whether the food manufacturing 
sector, as a whole, lobbied in the input markets through general and commodity- 
specific trade organizations. 
Lobbying by Food Firms  ir?  Their Output Murket 
Food finns, like other businesses, lobby in agricultural commodities markets against 
government regulations that adversely affect their production processes and output 
markets. Businesses regularly complain about the regulatory burden, compliance 
costs, and unfair competition practices from trading partners. For example, based 
on focus groups from various segments of the food sector. Adelaja et al. report that 
food manufacturers considered regulations to be the major issue constraining their 
activities. 
A recent survey of food processors with $5 million or more in annual sales listed 
the folIowing major concerns with government regulations: (a) regulations gov- 
erning operations, (b)  regulations governing safety and labeling which make the Ndrzlsismga and Kinsey  Political Corztl,ib1rrior7s  qf'Footi  ibfarii~fi7cr111~er.s  25 
process of product development more  expensive, and (c)  regulations governing 
constnlction. In addition, unemployment insurance and property taxes were deemed 
too costly by the same food processors. Analysis of the survey concluded that the 
initial  processors  of  raw  agricultural  commodities  are  the  most  affected  by 
goverriment regulations. A x2  test showed these regulations significantly affected 
food  processor  operations  (Torok,  Schroeder, and Menkhaus).  The  study  also 
reported  that,  because  larger sized food firms  had  a comparative advantage  in 
complying with government regulations, they were crowding out smaller firms. It 
was estimated that in  1979, approximately 30% of clerical time and $3 billion were 
spent on complying with government regulations. Since these regulations originate 
from political markets, and the costs involved (in terms of time and money) are 
argued to be substantial. food manufacturing firms have an interest in lobbying for 
or against them. Most of these regulations, however, are unrelated to agricultural 
policies affecting their raw inputs. 
Food firms also lobby to protect their products from competing imports through 
tariff and nontariff measures. Lopez and Pagoulatos observed that food processing 
industries in the United States are characterized by relatively low import penetration 
and export propensities. They also have more restrictive nominal tariff and nontariff 
barriers (NTBs) than other manufacturing industries, which limits imports from 
foreign competitors. To secure these policies, firms spend resources to compete in 
the political market to influence trade barriers in their favor. 
Lopez and Pagoulatos estimated that transfers to food processing films, due to 
tariffs, amounted to $8.4 billion  in  1972. Of these,  $1.7 billion  were  for meat 
products, $1.23 billion  for dairy products, $1.05 billion  for preserved fruits and 
vegetables,  $475.7 million  for  grain  mill  products,  $1 18.7 million  for bakery 
products, $421.8 million  for sugar confectionery, $1.8 billion  for fats and oils, 
and  $1.17 billion  for tobacco manufacturers. These numbers would  have  been 
even higher if nontariff measures had been taken  into consideration. The results 
indicate  that  food  firms  successfully lobby  in  their  output market.  Generating 
government  revenue  could not  have  been  a primary motive  for  these  policies 
since the  government only collected $499.2 million  in  tax revenue  from these 
tariffs. 
Political contributions by food firms may be directed toward government inter- 
vention in agricultural commodity markets relevant for their input supplies and 
costs, or policies and regulations in their output market, or both. Differentiating the 
impacts of their political contributions is the focus of this study. 
Theoretical Framework 
Food firms may lobby to benefit both their input and output markets, but they do not 
typically record political contributions for each market separately. One method to 
determine the amount allocated to various markets may be to design a survey asking 
food firms to report political contributions allocated to each  activity. However, 26  Spring 1999  Journal ofilgrih~1sir7e.s~ 
survey cost and information confidentiality make this option unattractive. Alterna- 
tively, publicly reported, aggregate political contributions can be used to estimate 
expenditures in each market. 
Formal methodologies for estimating variable input allocations have been devel- 
oped only recently. We adapt a profit-maximization  approach to input allocation 
developed by Just et al. They addressed the question of how to allocate. ex post, 
observed total input expenditures among different inputs, assuming that the fi~~n/ 
farm operates within a competitive profit-maximization environment. 
The lobbying component of the model has its roots and justification  in the rent- 
seeking literature, particularly in the work of Krueger; Becker; Cairns; Welliz and 
Wilson; Bhagwati  (1 980,  1982); Bhagwati  and Srinivasan; Zusman;  Peltzman; 
Magee, Brock, and Young; and Coggins, Graham-Tomasi, and Roe, among others. 
This literature starts from the proposition that since policies affect the welfare of 
organizations  and  individuals,  it  is  rational  for  them  to  allocate  resources  to 
influence policy choices in  their favor. Further, this literature  lnaintains that the 
lobbies'  objective is to maximize the econoinic surplus from lobbying activities 
adjusted for the resources expended for political influence. 
Following Coggins, Graham-Tornasi, and Roe, and Welliz and Wilson, lobbying 
is introduced into a profit-maximizing model via a pricing function which deter- 
mines the prices that economic agents receive  for their output, or pay for their 
inputs, as a function of lobbying expenditures (political contributions). The output 
(input) pricing function is assumed increasing (decreasing) and concave (convex) 
in  lobbying expenditures; that is, there are decreasing returns to political contri- 
butions. In the absence of lobbying, the pricing function yields the market price. The 
pricing  function is similar to Becker's influence function. However, the pricing 
function has the advantage ofbeing defined in variables that are directly observable. 
This pricing function is also known as the lobbying or tariff formation function in 
the trade literature where it has been used to incorporate political markets into trade 
models (Welliz and Wilson). 
Suppose a firm is engaged in lobbying in two activities (q,  y)  corresponding to the 
output and the input markets, respectively. The firm's objective is to influence the 
prices (I-, LY)  of the two activities. Let no,  and n,,.  denote the lobbying expenditures 
in activities q and y, respectively. The total observed lobbying expenditure to be 
allocated between the two activities is no.  The goal is to estimate n,,  and n,,  from the 
knowledge of no  and the behavioral assumption of profit maximization. 
Assurne  that, to maximize profit, the firm chooses the level  of output q  and 
lobbying expenditures n,,, and n,,,, and thus solves the following problem: 
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where I-(.) and g(.)  are the output and input pricing functions, respectively. These 
lobbying functions endogenize the input and output prices. C(.)  is the minimum cost 
of producing output q. The problem includes a lobbying constraint. The constraint 
may originate from the restrictions iinposed by the Federal Election Commission on 
the lnaximuin amount that economic agents can contribute to the political process. 
In addition, if the firm was to spend its entire resources on political contributions, 
it would be unable to collect lobbying benefits because access to the latter is tied to 
ownership of productive assets. In this case, the lobbying constraint is internal to the 
firm. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions defining the change 
in output prices (r) and input costs (c) with respect to lobbying activities (no,  and n,,.) 
are given by: 
and 
When combined, conditions (1) and (2) show that profit maximization requires 
marginal returns to be equalized in the two markets; that is, the firm must exhaust 
arbitrage opportunities. The objective is to use n,,  and the first-order conditions of 
profit maximization with respect to II,,, and no,,  to generate an estimable equation. 
This is done in equations (3)-(1  I). 
The elasticity with respect to the lobbying in the output and input markets is: 
Rearranging equation (3) implies that the marginal change in input costs and output 
prices is equal to the portion of revenue or costs spent to lobby to increase revenue 
or decrease costs multiplied by the elasticity of that activity: 
Using these elasticities, the first-order conditions can be rewritten as: 28  Spring 1999  Journal of'ilgribusiness 
and 
where R,,  is the revenue of the food firm, and C is the cost of producing output q. 
Assume that the elasticities e,, and e,, vary between the two markets, among firms, 
and over time, and can be decomposed as follows: 
(7)  e  0')  =  aq + bo +  d,; 
where a, is the output market component, a,, is the input market component, and b, 
and d, are the firm-specific and time components, respectively, which  for con- 
venience are assumed to be the same for the output (revenues) and input (cost) 
components of the firm. While this assumption saves degrees of freedom, it implies 
that a,  > a,..  This restriction either may be imposed on the empirical model or may 
be tested to check for its consistency with the data. We adopted the latter approach. 
Inserting equations  (7)  into  (5) and (6)  yields  two equations  which  can be 
combined and estimated  so that  lobbying expenditures can be allocated among 
activities: 
Adding (8) and (9) gives: 
where Ndayisenga and k'irz.rey  Political Contriblltioizs of Food Manlijacttcl-ers  29 
After the specification of the error structure, equation (1  0) can be estimated and the 
parameter  estimates, if significant, can be  inserted  into (8) and  (9) to  find  the 
allocations of the lobbying inputs between the input and output markets. Equation 
(1  3) (seen in the "Estimation and Results" section), which is the estimated version 
of equation (lo), is a model of the determinants of lobbying efforts. The parameter 
estimates from equation (1  3) permit the estimation of lobbying expenditures to the 
input and output markets through equations (I 1) and (12). 
This approach is similar to that used in modeling input allocation in multi-crop 
systems (Just et al.).  Note that (10) makes no assumption about the market structure. 
The revenues and costs may have been generated by a competitive firm, monopo- 
listically competitive firm, or any other market structure. It is important to note that 
no,,  and no,  are not observable. Suppose the estimated parameters are denoted as AY, 
A',  B", and L)'. Then, the profit-maximizing allocations of the total lobbying expen- 
diture between the input and output markets can be computed using equations (8) 
and (9) as follows: 
Not surprisingly, allocations of lobbying resources to each market are proportional 
to the returns generated by the two markets. In addition, the allocations implicitly 
depend on the relative returns since the estimating equation is derived from the first- 
order conditions of profit maximization. An implicit assumption behind this model 
is that lobbying expenditures can be fully allocated. However, it is more likely that 
part of the total lobbying budget is not allocatable and benefits both the input and 
output markets. Another implicit assumption is that the allocation of the lobbying 
resources takes the lobbying by other agents in the economy as given. 
Data Sources and Limitations 
The data needed to estimate equation (10) are (a)  costs, (b)  revenues for the firms 
in the sample, and (c) the lobbying expenditures by individual food manufacturing 
firms. The data used in this study are presented in table  1. 
Data on costs and revenues for food firms were collected from various issues of 
Moody 's  Industrial Manual and Standard and Poor's Iiidustry Suweys between 1983 
and 1987. Costs include the cost of material, the direct labor cost, and depreciation 
to account for the cost of capital. An important limitation of these data sources is 
that the information they provide is limited to publicly traded (owned) food firms. 
Neither Moody nor Standard and Poor provide any kind of financial information 
for firms that are not publicly owned. Thus, the sample of food firms used does 
not include privately owned food firms. A concern with using this type of firm-level 
data is that they may reflect accounting conventions more than the measurement 30  Spring 1999  Jo~rnral  oj'Ag~ihusiness 
Table 1. Food Firms' Average Lobbying Expenditures, Revenues, and Costs 
(1983-87) 
Food Company Names 
1  American Home Products 
2  Anheuser Busch 
3  Archer-Daniels Midland 
4  Borden 
5  Brown-Forman 
6  Castle & Cooke 
7  Clorox 
8  Coca-Cola 
9  ConAgra 
10  Dean Foods Company 
11  Flowers Industries 
12  General Mills 
13  Occidental Petroleum 
14  J. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 
15  Kellogg 
16  McKesson Corporation 
17  Nestle Enterprise, Inc. Group 
18  PepsiCo 
19  Philip Momis 
20  Quaker Oats 
21  Nabisco Brands 
22  Tasty Baking Company 
23  Universal Foods 




Revenue  Cost 
($000~)  ($000~) 
-- - 
So~trces:  Averages are conlputed from data collected from the Federal Election Commission 
Reports (lobbying expenditures), and from the hfoodj. i  Indzcstrial Marl~rals  and Standard and 
Poor's Indzl~t~y  Sziiveys (revenues and costs) over 1983. 1985, 1987. Ndajiisenga and Kinsey  Political Contributions of Food Manufacturers  3 1 
of economic concepts. This study, however, uses revenue and cost data which are 
not generally subject to extensive accounting adjustments. The issue would be far 
more relevant if profit or net income data were used. 
Data on federal political contributions, used as  a proxy for lobbying contributions 
by food firms in this analysis, are published by the Federal E!ection  Commission. 
The data are subject to some limitations. In particular, the data dc  not include (a)  the 
direct personal contributions by food firms' officers even though they may benefit 
the firm, (b) the costs of maintaining lobbying offices at various levels of gov- 
ernment, and (c) the value of time of lobbyists, as well as time and money spent 
contacting legislators directly. They include only direct contributions to political 
campaigns of candidates for federal offices. The data thus understate the contri- 
butions to lobbying efforts by the firms in this analysis. In addition, the selection 
of  firms  was  contingent  upon  availability  of  data  on  their  federal  campaign 
contributions. 
Estimation and Results 
Because ofthe assumption that the elasticities of lobbying with respect to the output 
price and input costs for food firms has three additive components, equation (1  0, 13) 
is linear in parameters. The finn-specific and time-specific effects are represented 
by dummy variables that interact with profit for each firm and time period in the 
sample. The resulting einpirical equation was estimated: 
where D, = 1 for the ith firm and zero otherwise, and D, = 1 for the tth time period 
(1983-85)  and zero otherwise. The total  lobbying expenditure of firn~  i is n,,,, in 
period t, R,, is the revenue for firm i in period t, C,,  is the cost of the goods sold for 
firm i in period t, and u,, is a stochastic error term of unknown heteroskedasticity. 
Equation (13) was estimated with SHAZAM econometric software using White's 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator to coirect for heteroske- 
dasticity. The sample contains 74 observations. 
The hypothesis that food firms' lobbying activity in their input markets is not 
significantly different from zero can be formulated as follows: 
Null Hypothesis:  H,:  A?  =  0; 
Alternate Hypothesis:  Ha:  A?' + 0 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it  can be concluded that food firms do not 
significantly lobby in their input market. 32  Spring 1999  Jo~tn~nl  of Agrih~tsine.rs 
Interpretation of Results 
The results (presented in table 2) indicate that the coefficient on the variable COST, 
which represents lobbying expenditures in  the  input markets, is not statistically 
different  froin zero. This is  interpreted to mean that food  firms do not spend a 
significant amount of their  resources to  lobby  in  their  input  markets  and, by 
implication, do not exercise significant political influence in agricultural commodity 
markets. The significance of the coefficient on the  variable  REVENUE, which 
captures lobbying expenditure in the output market, is statistically significant. The 
result suggests that the direct lobbying through food firms' political contributions 
is primarily directed to their output market. 
The variables labeled DP1 through DP23 in table 2 represent firn~s  1-23,  respec- 
tively, identified  by  name in  table  1. The coefficients on DP1-LIP23  (table 2) 
indicate whether the gross profit (as measured by R,  - C,,) for an individual finn 
is  significantly  correlated  with  its  total  lobbying  expenditures  relative  to  the 
reference firm. The reference firm is the last film listed in table  1  (Wilson Food 
Corporation). The finns are entered into the estimating equation in the order they 
appear in table  1. 
The gross profits  of only five finns are not significantly  related  to lobbying 
expenditures relative to Wilson Food Corporation (firms  1, 2, 6, 10. and 23). Four 
finns' profits have a significantly negative relationship between lobbying expendi- 
tures and profits (firms 13, 16, 17, and 20). For the remainder of the firms, increased 
profits are significantly correlated with greater lobbying expenditures. The last two 
coefficients in table 2 indicate that lobbying expenditures were less in  1983 and 
1985 relative to the reference year. 1984. 
Failure to reject the hypothesis that food firms do not lobby in the input market 
(an important component of which  is the supply of agricultural comn~odities)  is 
consistent with  the view that  food  finns have rnonopsony  power in  their input 
markets that allows them to negotiate lower prices despite government regulations, 
or they can pass through any cost increases to consumers, or  both. Whatever the case 
may be, the ultimate implication is that the food processing sector had no serious 
incentive to act as a countervailing power to the farm  lobby in  the  fonning or 
reforming of agricultural policy in the early part of the 1980s. 
This interpretation  should be qualified  in two respects. First, we estimated a 
fixed-effects model. The inferences are therefore conditional on the effects that are 
in the sample. Second, and as previously noted, the selection of firms was contin- 
gent upon the availability of data on their federal campaign contributions. As a 
consequence, conclusions from this analysis may not be widely generalizable across 
finns or over time. They are nonetheless useful for formulating hypotheses about 
the behavior and motivations of other food firms that participate in the political 
market. Nc/aviserzgrr and Kinsey  Political Coiztrib~itions  ?f'Fooc/ ilfanrifuctrli.e~:(.  33 
Table 2. Food Firms' Lobbying Expenditure Allocation Equation Estimates 
Estimated  Standard  t-Ratio 




























Notes:  b Dependent variable = TOTAL LOBBYING EXPENDITCTRE by each food firm 
Adjusted R'  = 0.8769 
Total number of observations = 74 33  Spring 1999  Jourrinl qf'Agrihi~.cit~c..c.s 
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